REJOINDER: TW AILING INTERNATIONAL LAW

James Thuo Gathii
Brad Roth's response to my Review of his book seeks to privilege his approach to international law as the most defensible.1 His re sponse does not engage one of the central claims of my Review -that present within international legal scholarship and praxis is a simulta neous and dialectical coexistence of the dominant conservative/liberal approach with alternative or Third World approaches to thinking and writing international law. Roth calls these alternative approaches critical and does not consider them insightful for purposes of dealing with issues such as anticolonialism. Roth's characterization of my Re view as falling within critical approaches to international law seems too quick and, in fact, fits in very nicely with neoconservative dismiss als of the progressive left, and indeed, of Third World scholarship. For example, the rise of the Critical Race Theory movement in American legal academia received the sort of response that Roth gives to my Review.2 Roth defends his formalistic and doctrinaire approach to the study of international law, which is divorced from the social, his torical, and political context within which international law operates. In short, he defends international law as an iron cage of rules and doc trines as if the law was not itself a "crucial site for the production of ideology and the perpetuation of social power."3 Such a view of international law, or indeed any social phenome non, simply elides the issues raised in my Review. Roth's characteri zation of my Review as "politically dysfunctional" epitomizes his fail ure to engage the pitfalls of formalist and doctrinaire thought in that it fails to engage the truism that states advance their interests, in part, through the medium of international law.4 It fails to debate whether international law is constitutive and not merely a reflection of the hi-erarchical character of international so�iety. As such, law does not stand outside the raw interests of states, ·but it produces those interests as much as it is the product of them. Consequently, the characteriza tion of my Review as politically dysfunctional is all the sadder since any fair reading suggests otherwise. It is thus odd that Roth seems to make much of the point that his brand of analysis is superior because it does not, like mine, abandon "the very devices that give the poor and weak a modicum of lever age."9 Yet, Roth does not tell us the ways in which the norms and doc trines of international law preclude the very realization of these noble goals. Perhaps Roth should do better than engage in a selective and misleading characterization of not only my analysis, but of TW AIL scholarship as well. TW AIL scholarship, like allied approaches to the study of law, has a long tradition of examining the promises of such concepts as the norm of sovereign equality of states against the exist ing reality of economic hierarchy and subordination between nations. Such an analysis does not throw legal concepts overboard, but rather foregrounds the existing reality of economic hierarchy and subordina-6. For some thoughts on this, see James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocen· tricity, 9 EUR. J. lNT 'L L. 184, 203-11 (1998) (reviewing SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) and SIBA N'ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS, AND AFRICANS (1996)). tion between nations in relation to the norm of sovereign equality.10 It does not take any cleverness to do that and Third World scholars need not learn this from their Western counterparts. That law legitimizes oppressive social order is at the very center of my critique of Roth's failure to examine how international law de-legitimated non-Western societies as incapable of possessing sovereignty -an argument that laid the basis for colonial conquest.
By contrast to this Third World position that expresses ambiva lence to international legal norms and doctrines, Roth regards his in ternational law of governmental illegitimacy as necessarily emancipa tory. He predicates this view on at least two propositions. First, governmental illegitimacy has the endorsement of Third World pro gressive leaders from whom Roth has "copiously" quoted. Such lead ers include Kwame Nkrumah, Raul Castro and Julius Nyerere.11 Sec ond, Roth states that he is interested in serving "to the extent possible, the long-term interests of the inhabitants of weak states."12 I do not challenge either proposition. Yet they are both predicated on the simplistic assumption that being "pro-small states" and "pro-left leaning Third World leaders" is as necessarily progressive as a defense of international legal norms and doctrines. For Roth, it is as if pro gressives are only those allied to his position. Roth seems to suggest that since I do not subscribe to his view of who a progressive is, I am necessarily reactionary.13 This is a curious claim since being in the company of Third World political leadership is hardly evidence of be ing avant garde or progressive.14 One only has to remember that barely ten years after the 1955 Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, a country that Roth has aligned himself with, forcibly put East Timor under its dictatorship. Hence, these responses are inadequate for at least two further reasons. First, they fail to en gage my primary criticisms of his book: its failure to engage the colo nial history of the international law of governmental illegitimacy and the underlying private order upon which governmental Bedjaoui, "[t] raditional international law has helped to make independence a completely superficial phenomenon, beneath the surface of which the old forms of domination survive and the economic empires of the multinational corporations, and the powers that protect them, prosper." Id. at 81.
One of the best Third World articulations of this theme is MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). According to
11. See Roth, supra note 1, at 2064. 12. Id. at 2061.
13. See id. at 2064 (stating that "[i]n repudiating conventional legal analysis [which inci dentally I do not] as Eurocentric, Gathii dismisses both the significance of Third World par ticipation in shaping contemporary norms and the extent of the Third World's stake in the continued vitality of these norms -an attitude not, so far as I can tell, broadly shared among Third World leaders, scholars, or peoples."). [ Vol. 98:2066 legitimacy/illegitimacy is predicated. Second, they are based on very simplistic assumptions about what is desirable for the Third World. These assumptions fail to take into account the complex relationship of normative and doctrinal work with the history of international law, and the oppressive reality over which international law gives credence at the expense of the Third World.
The lack of engagement with colonialism and the private order that legitimates public power is not a problem specific to Roth, but rather one associated with the triumphal universalism of the liberal/ conservative approaches of which his book is a part. The disengage ment with these issues, in my view, characterizes an essential neo conservative realist position. Contrary to what Roth may think, I am not therefore mistaken in characterizing his book as a neo conservative realist approach to international law.15 To the extent that colonialism and the economics underlying the exercise of public power are not a part of the discussion about legitimacy, the task of engaging legitimacy is both incomplete and consistent with the hegemony of the industrialized countries and their allies over the rest of the World. The tragedy is that Roth perceives his project as striking a "blow for anticolonialism,"16 but his book epitomizes complicity with a Western discourse that silences issues of Western power, economic justice, and the very neocolonialism that Roth purports to oppose. Although I do not represent the Third World, I am from it. Needless to say, I believe that the Third World contributes -and has indeed contributed tointernational legal theory as much as Roth contributes.
In conclusion, a basic problem with Governmental Illegitimacy is that it separates political and economic liberalism in its discussion of governmental illegitimacy. This distinction between political and eco nomic issues is rather artificial and does not even characterize post realist legal thought in American academia. In American academia, legal realism has shaken the foundations of the type of conceptualist and doctrinaire thought that Roth defends within the context of inter national law.
Roth's work reveals the degree to which liberal/ conservative international legal writing has remained insulated and aloof from some of the most significant developments in legal theory in the last century. Is such aloofness accidental? Whether accidental or not, such aloofness is ill-suited to addressing the challenges associ ated not only with neoliberalism or globalization in mainstream par lance, but also with issues relating to the Third World. Indeed, my Review sought to debunk Roth's simplistic characterization of the post-Cold War moment as if it merely could be captured as being a clash between universalism and cultural particularism. This is a poor rehash of the Eurocentricism that characterizes much of the analysis in the book. Instead of seeing the world through this simplistic lens, I suggest that the post-Cold War situation is one characterized by the recognition of multiple identities and heterogeneity, and the rejection of universalist modes of reasoning. Such multiplicity and heterogene ity, in turn, can best be appreciated if seen for what these identities and, indeed, norms and doctrines of international law are: constructed and contingent. The challenge for liberal/conservative approaches to international law, therefore, is to engage this postcolonial predicament rather than to defend international norms in the abstract, as Roth does in his defense of their utility for small states. For these reasons, the Third World has a lot to offer the First. Twailing international law will surely continue the dialectic that my Review of Roth's book pro voked. There is no better way of developing international legal the ory, or even addressing substantive questions of international justice, than through such a dialogue. That my Review has led to this dia logue, as I intended, is therefore a welcome result.
